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COMMENTS
One consistent point can be noted in all the Louisiana jury
separation cases 25-convictions are set aside only in instances
where one or more jurors have passed out of surveillance of the
court or its sworn deputies, thereby possibly exposing them to
influence from outsiders. Though there be a physical separation
of the jury, even for a period of several hours, a conviction
will nonetheless be upheld if all jurors were constantly super-
vised by a deputy who can testify that they have had no out-
side contacts sufficient to prejudice their verdict. In view of
this, the selection of mixed juries should cause no apprehension
among Louisiana district attorneys, even though it be necessary
for such juries to separate for sleeping and other purposes dur-
ing the course of the trial. It is submitted that our Supreme
Court would sustain a conviction made by such a separated jury
if the requirement of constant supervision by deputies had been
observed.
Charles W. Darnall, Jr.
Recovery for Mental Suffering in Louisiana
The weight of authority at early common law' considered
mental suffering, not accompanied by any other element of
actual damage, insufficient grounds for a recovery of damages. 2
The statement in the famous case of Lynch v. Knight,3 that
"[m]ental pain or anxiety the law cannot value, and does not
pretend to redress, when the unlawful act complained of causes
that alone," was the generally accepted rule. In the absence of
competent medical knowledge in the field, mental pain was re-
garded merely as a state of mind or feelings, hidden in the inner
25. The cases discussed present the most frequently urged types of jury
separations. The situations not presented add little to the pattern.
1. The growth of the law regarding mental suffering at common law
may be traced through the following articles: Bohlen, Right to Recover for
Injury Resulting from Negligence Without Impact, 50 U. OF PA. L. REV. 141
(1902); Goodrich, Emotional Disturbance as Legal Damage, 20 MICH. L. REV.
497 (1922); Green, "Fright" Cases, 27 ILL. L. REV. 761 (1933); Hallen, Damages
for Physical Injuries Resulting from Fright or Shock, 19 VA. L. REV. 253
(1933); Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts,
49 HARV. L. REV. 1033 (1936); Throckmorton, Damages for Fright, 34 HARV.
L. REV. 260 (1921), 57 AM. L. REV. 828 (1923); Wade, Tort Liability for Abu-
sive and Insulting Language, 4 VAND. L. REV. 63 (1950); Comment, Fright or
Nervous Shock as a Basis for the Recovery of Damages, 12 TULANE L. REV.
272 (1938).
2. Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896).
3. 9 H.L. Cas. 577, 598 (1861).
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consciousness of an individual, and too subtle and speculative
to be capable of measurement by any standard known to law.4
Reliance has been placed by those who would deny recovery for
mental suffering primarily upon the difficulty of proof and meas-
urement of damage; 5 the "remoteness" of damage resulting from
mental pain; 6 and the danger that the protection of such interests
would "open the door," not only to fraudulent and fictitious
claims, but to litigation in the field of bad manners and
trivialities. 7
The first contention, that the interest in mental tranquillity
is not susceptible of proof and measurement, seems questionable
in the light of the numerous decisions to the contrary. Moreover,
even with classical Roman law, recovery was allowed for an
outrage to the feelings under the concept of injuria8 Similarly,
in early German and Anglo-Saxon law, compensation was given
for an insult to one's sense of dignity. The forcible shaving of
one's head, for example, subjected the wrongdoer to heavy
damagesY Today, mental suffering is widely regarded as sus-
ceptible of satisfactory proof and certainly seems no harder to
estimate in pecuniary terms than the pain arising from a broken
leg, for example, for which recovery has always been allowed.10
With respect to the supposed "remoteness" of damage in
the form of mental pain, it may be said that perhaps courts some-
times classify as remote those injuries for which they do not
wish to allow recovery. Yet why should courts single out as
remote certain injuries simply because they are not traditionally
regarded as physical in character? Indeed, the belief is often
expressed that in reality all mental suffering is physical in
4. See Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896).
5. Ibid.
6. Braun v. Craven, 175 Ill. 401, 51 N.E. 657 (1898); Spade v. Lynn &
Boston R.R., 168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897).
7. Spade v. Lynn & Boston R.R., 168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897); Ward
v. West Jersey & S.R.R., 65 N.J.L. 383, 47 Atl. 561 (1900); Huston v Freemans-
burg Borough, 212 Pa. 548, 61 Atl. 1022 (1905); see Throckmorton, Damages
for Fright, 34 HARV. L. REv. 260, 57 AM. L. REV. 828 (1921).
8. DIGEST 47.10.1 cites Labeo's writings. See LEE, THE ELEMENTS OF ROMAN
LAW 382 (3d ed. 1952). See also Stewart v. Arkansas Southern R.R., 112 La.
764, 768, 36 So. 676, 677 (1904) ("In our Code [Articles 2315-2317] the wise
precept of the Institutes of Justinian are incorporated in substance, to wit:
'Juris praecepta sunt, alterum non laedere, suum cuique tribuere...' (looks
to the liability of all damages].")
9. Laws of Ethelbert, nos. 33-61 (circa 600), found in POUND & PLUCK-
NETT, READINGS ON THE HISTORY AND SYSTEM OF THE COMMON LAW 46 (3d ed.
1927).
10. McCORMICK, DAMAGES 315 (1935); Yates v. South Kirkby Collieries,
2 K.B. 538, 79 L.J.K.B. 1035 (1910); Hargis v. Knoxville Power Co., 175 N.C.
31, 94 S.E. 702 (1917).
[VOL. XV
1955] COMMENTS 453
character. Darwin described the physical symptoms of fright as
follows: "The frightened man at first stands like a statue, motion-
less and breathless, or crouches down as if instinctively to escape
observation. . . . The heart beats wildly, or may fail to act and
faintness ensues; there is a death like pallor; . . . utter prostra-
tion soon follows, and the mental powers fail. . . ."11 Some
authorities consider it impossible to experience fear as a purely
emotional thing12 and maintain that not only fright and shock,
but also grief, anxiety, rage, and shame, are actually "physical"
injuries and produce well-marked symptoms readily detected by
the medical expert.'3
The third and strongest objection to allowing recovery for
mental suffering is based upon the problem of judicial adminis-
tration which such a policy might present. 4 It is often stated
that protection of the interest in mental tranquillity by allowing
damages for mental suffering is reasonably certain to result in a
vast increase in litigation.' 5 However, the fear of the "flood of
litigation" which may result from "opening the door" should not
prevent recovery for a wrong. Nevertheless, since mental suffer-
ing can be easily simulated, it must be admitted that there is
some danger of fictitious claims and vexatious suits.16 Moreover,
as one author very aptly stated, "against a large part of the fric-
tions and irritations of temperaments incident to participation
in a community life, a certain toughening of the mental hide is a
better protection than the law could ever be."'17 But in the final
analysis, especially in view of the advance of medical knowledge,
there seems to be no reason for denying recovery for a given
mental injury which is proved to be both genuine and serious in
character.'8
11. DARWIN, EXPRESSION OF EMOTIONS IN MAN AND ANIMALS, quoted by
CRILE, THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE EMOTIONS 26-28 (1915).
12. Id. at 60 ("fear influences every organ and tissue").
13. Goodrich, Emotional Disturbance as Legal Damage, 20 MICH. L. REV.
497 (1922); Chiuchiolo v. New England Wholesale Tailors, 84 N.H. 329, 150
AtI. 540 (1930).
14. "Whatever justification there may be rests in the courts' fear that
unscrupulous lawyers with the aid of equally unscrupulous doctors may
obtain from sympathetic juries verdicts upon purely fabricated evidence."
Bohlen, Fifty Years of Torts, 50 HARV. L. REV. 725, 733 (1937).
15. Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896).
16. Spade v. Lynn & Boston R.R., 168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897).
17. Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts,
49 HARV. L. REV. 1033, 1035 (1936).
18. Pecoraro v. Kopanica, 173 So. 203, 204 (La. App. 1937) ("Even though
there may be no actual objective symptoms of injury, there may be recovery
for nervous shock if the evidence concerning such nervous condition is
sufficient to warrant the belief that such injuries were actually sustained."
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These general considerations apply to recovery for mental
suffering in Louisiana. However, our jurisprudence is technically
based upon two articles of the Civil Code. 9 Article 2315 of the
Civil Code of 1870 provides that
"Every act whatever of man that causes damage to another,
obliges him by whose fault it happens to repair it. .. ."
In Quina v. Roberts20 and Laird v. Natchitoches Oil Mill,2 ' it is
stated that Article 2315 contemplates redress to all who suffer
injury, including mental pain and suffering, in consequence of
another's wrongful or negligent act.22
Article 1934,23 which provides the measure of damages for
the breach of contractual obligations, states in part:
".. . [T]here are cases in which damages may be assessed
without calculating altogether on the pecuniary loss, or the
privation of pecuniary gain to the party. Where the contract
has for its object the gratification of some intellectual enjoy-
ment, whether in religion, morality-or taste, or some con-
venience or other legal gratification, although these are not
appreciated in money by the parties, yet damages are due
for their breach; . . . a promise of marriage, or an engage-
ment for a work of some of the fine arts, are objects and
examples of this rule."
This article provides a basis of recovery for damage which from
its very nature is not susceptible of accurate and arithmetical
appraisement. 24 The courts have interpreted Article 1934 as
allowing recovery of damages for mental suffering25 and have
allowed such recovery in cases involving breach of contract,26
wrongful death 2 7 trespass to property,2 8 and false imprison-
ment.
29
19. Arts. 1934, 2315, LA. CIVIL CODE OF 1870.
20. 16 So.2d 558 (La. App. 1944).
21. 10 La. App. 191, 120 So. 692 (1929).
22. See also Black v. Carrollton R.R., 10 La. Ann. 33 (1855).
23. Art. 1934, LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870.
24. Graham v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 109 La. 1069, 34 So. 91
(1903).
25. Ibid.
26. Jiles v. Venus Community Center Benev. Mut. Aid Ass'n, 191 La. 803,
186 So. 342 (1939) (failure of physician to perform services); Lewis v. Holmes,
109 La. 1030, 34 So. 66 (1903).
27. Thompson v. New Orleans Ry. & Light Co., 148 La. 698, 87 So. 716
(1921).
28. Tissot v. Great Southern Tel. & Tel. Co., 39 La. Ann. 996, 3 So. 261
(1887).
29. Block v. McGuire, 18 La. Ann. 417 (1866).
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Louisiana has allowed recovery for mental suffering in other
types of suits. While all these cases seem to have been decided
for the most part without reference to each other, when viewed
together, they prove significant. For purposes of discussion, they
can be grouped under two general headings: (1) Intentionally
Caused Mental Suffering, and (2) Negligently Caused Mental
Suffering.
Intentionally Caused Mental Suffering"
It is quite understandable that courts should allow recovery
for the intentional infliction of mental suffering. Such conduct
exists when the wrongful act in question is done for the express
purpose of causing emotional distress or with knowledge on the
part of the actor that it is substantially certain to follow. Courts
confronted with cases in which the defendant has acted mali-
ciously or intentionally may appreciate readily that the mental
suffering usually caused by such conduct is real and substantial.
In such cases, there is an element of outrage which is in itself
an important guarantee that mental disturbance that follows is
serious, and not merely feigned.3 ' Thus the practical joker who
playfully tells a woman that her husband has hanged himself
should expect to be held liable for her resulting mental suffer-
ing.32 The American Law Institute has expressed what is becom-
ing the majority view: "One who, without a privilege to do so,
intentionally causes severe emotional distress to another is
liable (a) for such emotional distress, and (b) for bodily harm
resulting from it." 3
In many jurisdictions courts have been reluctant to award
damages for mental suffering unless they could find an indication
of an independent tort to use as a "peg" upon which to hang an
award of damages. Under the common law of assault,3 4 where
the wrongful conduct of the defendant is calculated to produce
an immediate apprehension of a harmful or offensive touching,
such "parasitic"3 5 damages received early recognition. Thus the
rule permitted recovery for a movement of the hand that might
30. See Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New Tort,
37 MicH. L. REV. 874 (1939).
31. Spade v. Lynn & Boston R.R., 168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897) ("he
who acts 'wantonly' without regard to the consequences, will be subject to
more extended liability for mental suffering.").
32. Bielitski v. Obadiak, 2 W.W. Rep. 283, 65 Dom. L. Rep. 627 (1922).
33. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 46 (Supp. 1948).
34. I de S v. W. de S, Y. B. Lib. Assis. f. 99, pl. 60 (1348).
35. STREET, THE FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABILITY 470 (1906).
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frighten the plaintiff but slightly.3 6 In Louisiana, the courts
have been very liberal in awarding damages for mental suffering
in assault cases. 37 In one recent decision, 38 the court held that
the defendant, who merely snatched a rooster from the plaintiff's
grasp, was liable in damages for the victim's mental shock. It
seems clear that the court regarded the defendant's alleged
assault and battery as a "peg" upon which to hang the real
damage, mental suffering, incurred by the plaintiff. Such "para-
sitic" damages have not been limited to assault cases, however.
Recovery has also been allowed where mental suffering has
arisen from false imprisonment,3 9 intentional breach of con-
tract,40 and defamation.41 Similarly, the violation of a criminal
blackmail statute has served as the basis of recovery for mental
suffering. 42 However, some courts in other jurisdictions have dis-
carded all "pegs" and held the defendant liable for the infliction
of mental suffering alone. 43
Some Louisiana cases have based liability upon a so-called
"trespass" on the plaintiff's property. In Humphreys v. Bennett
Oil Corporation,44 the plaintiff was allowed to recover for mental
suffering when the defendants drilled oil wells near the graves
of his deceased relatives. In many such cases the common law
courts base liability upon a technical trespass to a "property
right"45 in the dead body allegedly owned by the plaintiff. A
very recent Louisiana district court decision allowed all six
members of a family damages for their mental suffering caused
by the negligent burning of the father's corpse by employees of
a wrecker service.46 One Louisiana court went so far as to grant
36. Trogdon v. Terry, 172 N.C. 540, 90 S.E. 583 (1916).
37. Bonneval v. American Coffee Co., 127 La. 57, 53 So. 426 (1910); Car-
rick v. Joachim, 126 La. 5, 52 So. 173 (1910); Newsom v. Starns, 142 So. 704
(La. App. 1932) (in action for tarring and feathering, plaintiff's feelings of
humiliation and disgrace, together with physical pain, must be considered
in determining actual and compensatory damages); Hays v. Barcellona, 142
So. 164 (La. App. 1932) (defendant who shoots at plaintiff is liable for terror
caused).
38. Brennan v. Hardy, 172 So. 541 (La. App. 1937).
39. Block v. McGuire, 18 La. Ann. 417 (1866).
40. Enders v. Skannal, 35 La. Ann. 1000 (1883).
41. Kennedy v. Item Co., 213 La. 347, 34 So.2d 886 (1948); Jozsa v. Moro-
ney, 125 La. 813, 51 So. 908 (1910).
42. E.g., Tuyes v. Chambers, 144 La. 723, 81 So. 265 (1919).
43. Johnson v. Sampson, 167 Minn. 203, 208 N.W. 814 (1926) (defendants
falsely charged plaintiff with having had sexual intercourse with various
men).
44. 195 La. 531, 197 So. 222 (1940).
45. Langford v. West Oakwood Cemetery Addition, Inc., 223 S.C. 350, 75
S.E.2d 865 (1953).




recovery when town employees unjustifiably cut up shade trees
belonging to the plaintiff.47
Certain persons or corporations engaged in the business of
public transportation have been regarded as being under a special
duty to use care in protecting their passengers from mental as
well as physical injuries. Accordingly, they have been held
responsible for the conduct of their employees who insult or
humiliate passengers in any unreasonable manner. 4 In such
instances the common law courts have based recovery on an
"imllied contract to be polite. '49  Louisiana courts, although
placing reliance on the articles of the Code, have reached similar
results. In the case of Haile v. New Orleans Ry. & Light Co.,50
the defendant's servant called the plaintiff a "big fat woman"
and insinuated that she belonged in the rear of the bus. Damages
were allowed because of the "humiliation" and "mortification"
which the plaintiff suffered. The courts have also upheld actions
against carriers who try to put white persons in the Negro
sections5 1 or who accuse passengers of trying to "beat the fare." 52
A similar rule of liability has been imposed upon theater owners53
and hotel keepers.54
The relationships existing between landlords and collection
agents and their respective clients have provided further bases of
recovery for mental suffering. When a landlord maliciously
harassed his tenant with unjustified "writs of ejectment," he was
held liable for the tenant's outrage.5 5 In a recent California case,56
a plaintiff recovered damages from a landlord who used abusive
language in evicting him. There, the court considered the plain-
tiff's mental suffering, the only damage shown, as independently
actionable. In recent years Louisiana courts have allowed dam-
ages for mental suffering in certain collection cases. Thus in
Davis v. Lindsay Furniture Co.,51 an employer was held liable
for the humiliation and mental suffering caused by his collection
47. Oglesby v. Town of Winnfleld, 27 So.2d 137 (La. App. 1946).
48. May v. Shreveport Traction Co., 127 La. 420, 53 So. 671 (1910).
49. See Wheat, The Liability of the Carrier to Passengers for Injuries by
its Servants, 14 MICH. L. REV. 626 (1916).
50. 135 La. 229, 65 So. 225 (1914).
51. May v. Shreveport Traction Co., 127 La. 420, 53 So. 671 (1910).
52. Carter v. New Orleans Ry. & Light Co., 135 La. 151, 65 So. 15 (1914).
53. Vogel v. Saenger Theatres, 207 La. 835, 22 So.2d 189 (1945).
54. Moody v. Kenny, 153 La. 1007, 97 So. 21 (1923) (wanton and malicious
conduct of hotel employees).
55. Deslonde v. O'Hearn, 39 La. Ann. 14, 1 So. 286 (1887).
56. Emden v. Vitz, 88 Cal. App.2d 313, 198 P.2d 696 (1948).
57. 19 La. App. 169, 138 So. 439 (1931).
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agent who attempted to recover furniture from the plaintiff's
home in a forcible manner.
As early as 1903, Louisiana courts have permitted recovery
for mental suffering in the "breach of contract" cases. In the
famous "wedding dress" case,58 a bride was granted recovery for
the "mortification and humiliation" occasioned by the defen-
dant's negligent breach of his contract to furnish her with her
trousseau. The same position was taken in a recent case wherein
a laundry failed to return the only suit of a prospective groom in
time for the wedding.5" In another case members of a social
club were awarded damages for the mental suffering resulting
from the defendant's breach of a contract to furnish them with
a certain pavilion for a picnic.6 0 Although in these cases no
active intent on the part of the defendant to cause damage was
shown, it seems that his knowledge of the importance and signi-
ficance of fulfilling the contract was necessary to create liability. 1
Thus recovery has been allowed in a similar manner against a
telegraph company for the negligent transmission of a message,
the very contents of which suggest that damage may result.
62
It is frequently quite difficult to draw the line between fictitious
and valid claims of this nature, yet Louisiana courts have not
hesitated to deny recovery in several borderline cases .
3
Some courts have allowed recovery for the consequences of
practical jokes of a heartless, malicious type. In the famous
English case of Wilkinson v. Downton,6 4 the defendant jokingly
told a woman that her husband had been seriously injured. There
the court, in holding the defendant liable, assumed that he had
"willfully done an act calculated to cause physical harm to the
plaintiff. '6 5 Later, another defendant was held liable for the
mental suffering of a sensitive customer to whom he presented
a dead rat wrapped with groceries.6 6 The Supreme Court of
58. Lewis v. Holmes, 109 La. 1030, 34 So. 66 (1903).
59. Mitchell v. Shreveport Laundries, 61 So.2d 539 (La. App. 1952); see
also Johnson v. Levy, 118 La. 447, 43 So. 46 (1907) (breach of marriage
promise).
60. O'Meallie v. Moreau, 116 La. 1020, 41 So. 243 (1906).
61. Garner v. Burnstein, 1 La. App. 19 (1924).
62. Graham v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 109 La. 1069, 34 So. 91
(1903).
63. Thus recovery was denied in the following "breach of contract"
cases: Lillis v. Anderson, 21 So.2d 389 (La. App. 1945) (building alteration
and improvement contract); Norman v. Radio Station KRMD, Inc., 187 So.
831 (La. App. 1939) (breach of contract for radio advertising).
64. [1897] 2 Q.B. 57.
65. Id. at 58.




Louisiana permitted recovery in a similar case, Nickerson v.
Hodges.'7 There an old maid was tricked into digging up a
buried "pot of gold" under circumstances of extreme public
humiliation. Referring to Article 2315 as the basis of recovery,
the court said "the mental suffering and humiliation must have
been quite unbearable, to say nothing of the disappointment . . .
which she carried to her grave. ' 68
Although in certain limited situations the common law has
permitted recovery where the plaintiff's mental distress is caused
by an act intended to affect a third person,69 Louisiana courts
have consistently denied recovery in such cases.70 However, it
seems that the doctrine of "transferred intent"' as recognized in
assault and battery cases, could be employed in some mental
suffering cases supported by sufficient evidence.
Negligently Caused Mental Suffering
Where the conduct of the defendant is merely negligent, and
the element of intentional or malicious action is lacking, the
problem becomes even more difficult. Since most cases concern-
ing intentionally caused mental suffering involve the element of
humiliation and disgrace, or affect one's sense of honor, triers of
fact are better able to appreciate such damage than the fright
or shock caused by a negligent defendant who, for example,
nearly causes an accident. However, since the courts should
redress all wrongs, it seems that one guilty of neglect, or want
of due regard for the feelings of another, should be responsible
to the latter for whatever damage his conduct, though not
malicious, has produced.7 2
Although cases involving negligently caused mental suffer-
ing can arise in a variety of situations, a large number arise as
incidents to traffic and automobile accidents. Decisions allowing
damages for negligently caused mental suffering arising from
independent causes of action are also numerous.
Fright and Shock. The traditional view at early common
law was that claims for mental suffering based upon fright and
shock were not actionable.73 However, due to the complexities
67. 146 La. 735, 84 So. 37 (1920).
68. Id. at 741, 84 So. at 39.
69. Lambert v. Brewster, 97 W.Va. 124, 125 S.E. 244 (1924).
70. Knox v. Allen, 4 La. App. 223 (1926); Sperier v. Ott, 116 La. 1087,
41 So. 323 (1906).
71. See PROSSER, A HAND3OOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 47 (1941).
72. Kernan v. Chamberlin, 5 Rob. 116 (La. 1843).
73. Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896).
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of modern society, numerous accidents giving rise to threats of
mental as well as physical injuries have occurred. Today courts
have realized, although with some hesitation, that many such
claims are genuine and have accordingly allowed recovery for
negligently caused mental suffering in the form of fright and
shock. Again, the courts are faced with the administrative prob-
lem presented by allowing recovery for mental suffering. In
order to solve this problem, they have adopted certain rules
designed to guarantee that the mental suffering in question is
genuine.
Some common law courts require that the actionable fright
and shock experienced by the plaintiff be accompanied by a
tangible physical injury.7 4 It is universally agreed that recovery
for mental suffering will be permitted in such cases, 75 probably
because such injuries provide sufficient assurance that the mental
injury in question is not feigned.
A majority of the courts at common law refuse to permit
recovery when mental suffering is not preceded by a physical
injury, unless some "impact" upon the plaintiff's person has
occurred.7 6 Again, it seems that this rule is required to afford
some guarantee that the mental suffering is genuine. It is evi-
dent that, under this rule, some bona fide claims will be unjustly
dismissed. There are several interesting Louisiana decisions
allowing recovery for negligently caused mental suffering where
no physical harm was involved. In Laird v. Natchitoches Oil Mill,
Inc.,77 recovery was allowed for mental suffering when a boy's
bicycle was struck by the defendant's truck, even though the
boy suffered no physical harm. Again, in Klein v. Medical Bldg.
Realty Co.,78 plaintiff's fright, caused by the falling of plaster
from a ceiling, and resulting in traumatic hysteria, afforded the
basis of recovery for mental suffering. One negligent truck
driver, who collided with the car in which an expectant mother
was riding, was forced to compensate for her mental anguish,
caused by fear that her unborn child would be deformed at
birth. 9
In many instances "impact" has become a mere technical
74. 1 STREET, THE FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABILITY 470 (1906).
75. See PROSSER, A HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 34(a) (1941).
76. Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896).
77. 10 La. App. 191, 120 So. 692 (1929).
78. 147 So. 122 (La. App. 1933). See also Dyer v. Warwick, 19 La. App.
354, 140 So. 254 (1934).
79. Muller v. Herrin Motor Lines, Inc., 184 So. 406 (La. App. 1938).
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requirement and seems to serve the same purpose that a techni-
cal "peg" serves in cases involving intentionally caused mental
suffering. Thus in many jurisdictions the term "impact" has
come to have slight and absurd meanings,80 such as the entrance
of dust in the eye, a slight blow, or contact with exhaled smoke.
One Louisiana court found "impact" when the railway car in
which the plaintiff was riding jolted, although she received no
bruises and was not thrown from her seat.8 1 However, one recent
recovery for the plaintiff's alleged mental suffering when the
decision takes a more conservative view which seems to restrict
the meaning of "impact" to physical contacts with the physical
person of the plaintiff. Thus the Louisiana Supreme Court denied
defendant's brick wall fell aginst the plaintiff's house, and
frightened her.82 The court apparently felt that the evidence of
mental suffering was insufficient to justify an award of damages.
Several courts have repudiated the requirement of "impact" and
have regarded the physical consequences of mental suffering as
a sufficient guarantee of its reality.83
Last, a great many of the common law jurisdictions permit
recovery in limited situations where mental disturbances occur
as a result of negligent conduct primarily affecting a third per-
son. 4 Louisiana courts have taken a contrary view. In Black v.
Carrollton R.R.,8 5 an early Louisiana case in which a father was
denied recovery for mental anguish caused by the mutilation
of his minor son in a railroad accident, one Justice said, "[L]et
us bear in mind the difficulty which would result from recogniz-
ing the mental suffering of the third party as an element of
damage. Where is any but an arbitrary limit to be found in
extending its benefit? '8 6 Wrongful death actions provide the
sole exceptions to the above mentioned rule. Under Article 2315
of the Civil Code, Louisiana courts have, in wrongful death
actions, allowed recovery by the spouse for the loss of consortium,
80. Homans v. Boston Elev. Ry., 180 Mass. 456, 62 N.E. 737 (1902); Porter
v. Delaware, L. & W.R.R., 73 N.J.L. 405, 63 Atl. 860 (1906); Morton v. Stack,
122 Ohio St. 115, 170 N.E. 869 (1930).
81. Favalora v. New Orleans Ry. & Light Co., 143 La. 572, 78 So. 944
(1918).
82. Pecoraro v. Kopanica, 173 So. 203 (La. App. 1937).
83. Kenney v. Wong Len, 81 N.H. 427, 128 Atl. 343 (1925); Sundquist v.
Madison Ry., 197 Wis. 83, 221 N.W. 392 (1928).
84. Spearman v. McCrary, 4 Ala. App. 473, 58 So. 927 (1912); Cohn v.
Ansonia Realty Co., 162 App. Div. 791, 148 N.Y. Supp. 39 (1914). See also
Rasmussen v. Benson, 133 Neb. 449, 275 N.W. 674 (1937).
85. 10 La. Ann. 33 (1855).
86. Id. at 42.
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by the parent for the loss of the child's affection and fellowship,
and by the child for the loss of the parent's advice and society.8 7
The legislature apparently thought it necessary, however, as a
sound administrative policy, to limit recovery in such instances
to cases involving members of the immediate family of the
plaintiff.88
David M. Ellison, Jr.
87. Note, 14 LOUISIANA LAW REmVEw 713, 715, n. 12 (1954).
88. Art. 2315, LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870.
